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555066ANN The Annals of the American AcademyQuestionnaire Design Effects in Climate Surveys
research-article2014
Despite strong agreement among scientists, public 
opinion surveys reveal wide partisan disagreement on 
climate issues in the united States. we suggest that this 
divide may be exaggerated by questionnaire design 
variables. Following a brief literature review, we report 
on a national survey experiment involving u.S. 
Democrats and Republicans (n = 2,041) (fielded August 
25–September 5, 2012) that examined the effects of 
question wording and order on the belief that climate 
change exists, perceptions of scientific consensus, and 
support for limiting greenhouse gas emissions. wording 
a questionnaire in terms of “global warming” (versus 
“climate change”) reduced Republicans’ (but not 
Democrats’) existence beliefs and weakened percep-
tions of the scientific consensus for both groups. 
Moreover, “global warming” reduced Republicans’ sup-
port for limiting greenhouse gases when this question 
immediately followed personal existence beliefs but not 
when the scientific consensus question intervened. we 
highlight the importance of attending to questionnaire 
design in the analysis of partisan differences.
Keywords: climate change; global warming; question 
wording; scientific consensus; framing 
effects; partisan differences; survey exper-
iments
As survey researchers are well aware, even seemingly trivial differences in questionnaire 
design can dramatically shift the responses 
obtained, posing formidable challenges for the 
interpretation of data obtained through self-
reports. the large literature on question wording 
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effects is rich with instructive examples, as when 48 percent of u.S. respondents 
oppose “allowing” speeches against democracy while only 21 percent support 
 “forbidding” them (Schuman and Presser 1981).
One area in which the challenge of wording effects is particularly apparent is 
polling on topics for which no standard terminology exists to represent the issue 
at hand. this is the case for climate change. Various terms—including “global 
warming,” “climate change,” “global climate change,” and “the greenhouse 
effect”—are routinely used in climate surveys in a more or less interchangeable 
manner, yet scholars have only recently begun documenting the different ways 
that the general public reacts to these terms (e.g., greenhill et al. 2013; Schuldt, 
Konrath, and Schwarz 2011; Villar and Krosnick 2011; whitmarsh 2009). to date, 
this work has yielded some complementary as well as seemingly inconsistent 
results.
we first review the emerging literature on effects of climate terminology, situ-
ating it within the interdisciplinary literature on framing effects and drawing out 
implications for surveys that seek to assess public opinion on climate change. In 
light of the well-established tendency for Democrats and liberals to report higher 
levels of belief, concern, and support for addressing climate change than do 
Republicans and conservatives (hoffman 2011; McCright and Dunlap 2011; 
Nisbet and Myers 2007), we consider the role that questionnaire design might 
play in the apparent partisan divide on this issue. we then present new data from 
a survey experiment with more than 2,000 Democrats and Republicans in the 
united States that tested the effects of two common wording variants—“global 
warming” and “climate change”—on three fundamental beliefs that are routinely 
polled in climate surveys, namely, whether the phenomenon actually exists, 
whether scientists agree about its existence, and whether climate-mitigation 
policies (e.g., a mandatory reduction in CO2 emissions) deserve support.
Motivating this work are the discrepant wordings of climate surveys and the 
press coverage they receive. For instance, a Pew Research poll conducted in 
October 2010 asked 2,251 u.S. adults “…is there solid evidence that the average 
temperature on Earth has been getting warmer over the past few decades, or 
not?” and found that Democrats were much more likely than Republicans to 
endorse this belief (79 percent vs. 38 percent, respectively) (Pew Research 
Center 2010). Although respondents were not asked about “climate change” per 
se, press headlines nevertheless evoked the term in their coverage of the survey 
(e.g., “big Partisan gap on Climate Change…”) (Marshall 2010), raising 
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questions about whether the partisan divide would indeed have been as large if 
the survey question had asked about “climate change” instead.
Previous work on Climate terminology
During the first term of the george w. bush administration, the political strate-
gist Frank Luntz issued what is now a well-known memo that urged fellow 
Republicans to mind their words when discussing climate issues. In the memo, 
Luntz suggested that the administration should emphasize “climate change” 
rather than “global warming” in its communications, under the assumption that 
the more frightening connotations of the latter might heighten the public’s con-
cern and willingness to address the problem’s manmade causes (burkeman 
2003). A decade later, we are better able to judge the wisdom of Luntz’s advice, 
as researchers have begun exploring how the different ways of framing this issue 
affects environmental beliefs, attitudes, and behavior (e.g., Lakoff 2010; Myers 
et al. 2012; Nisbet 2009), producing a handful of published studies that explicitly 
examine citizens’ reactions to “global warming,” “climate change,” and other 
terms that are used more or less interchangeably in public discourse on climate 
issues, despite their different technical meanings.1
Such studies have a theoretical home in the literature on framing effects that 
spans political science, sociology, psychology, communication, and related disci-
plines (Entman 1993). Frames are commonly conceived as embedded communi-
cation devices that draw the audience’s attention to a subset of relevant 
considerations at the expense of others (e.g., framing gun control as an individual 
rights vs. public safety issue), thereby privileging certain ways of thinking and 
ultimately different preferences and opinions (for an overview, see Chong and 
Druckman 2007). Similarly, because the varying terms used in climate change 
surveys highlight different dimensions of the broader issue (e.g., “global warm-
ing” highlights one specific aspect of “climate change”), they can be viewed as 
emphasis frames (Druckman 2001) with the potential to shape apparent public 
opinion on climate issues.
In this vein, whitmarsh (2009) surveyed 589 residents in the south of England 
to assess whether “global warming” and “climate change” evoke different con-
notations using a series of open- and closed-ended items. the findings high-
lighted some broad differences, with “global warming” conjuring stronger 
associations of rising temperatures and human causation and “climate change” 
evoking stronger associations of more holistic climatic changes and natural causa-
tion. For instance, when asked “What do you know about global warming [cli-
mate change]?” 30.1 percent of respondents in the “global warming” condition 
indicated an association with temperature increase compared to only 16.2 per-
cent in the “climate change” condition.2 Similarly, both pollution (16.3 percent 
vs. 6.9 percent) and carbon dioxide (10.6 percent vs. 4.7 percent)—products of 
human activity—were endorsed by more respondents in the “global warming” 
condition.
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Although such findings suggest that the different terms employed in climate 
surveys evoke different interpretations among the public, whether they would 
appreciably sway public opinion—as Luntz’s memo implied—remained unclear. 
In a study assessing perceptions of problem seriousness, Villar and Krosnick 
(2011) recruited a large nonrepresentative sample of more than 3,000 American 
adults from various Internet sources and randomly assigned them to one of three 
terminology conditions: “global warming,” “climate change,” or “global climate 
change.” Specifically, respondents were asked, “If nothing is done to reduce 
[global warming/climate change/global climate change], how serious of a problem 
do you think it will be? {Extremely serious, Very serious, Moderately serious, 
Slightly serious, Not at all serious}.” In addition to the wording manipulation, the 
researchers counterbalanced the order of the response options, such that some 
respondents received the above order while others received the reverse order 
(i.e., Not at all serious came first). Although no main effect of terminology on 
perceived seriousness was observed, Democrats perceived climate change as 
marginally less serious than global warming, whereas Republicans perceived 
global warming as marginally less serious than climate change. For its part, the 
response-order manipulation revealed a significant primacy effect, with greater 
seriousness ratings observed when the “Extremely serious” option came first. In 
a separate study (published together with the study above), Villar and Krosnick 
(2011) embedded a global warming/climate change manipulation into a survey of 
more than 30,000 respondents from European nations who were asked the fol-
lowing open-ended question in face-to-face interviews: “In your opinion, which 
of the following do you consider to be the most serious problem currently facing 
the world as a whole?” Depending on condition, the first response option was 
either global warming or climate change, followed by eight additional choice 
options (e.g., international terrorism, poverty). Respondents also rated the per-
ceived seriousness of their answer choice. Although results showed that signifi-
cantly more respondents endorsed “climate change” than “global warming,” the 
proportions themselves were substantively about equal (63.5 percent vs. 
62.3 percent, respectively) and perceived seriousness varied little across terms, 
regardless of political orientation.
On the whole, results from Villar and Krosnick (2011) call into question the 
wisdom of Luntz’s suggestion. Overall, global warming and climate change were 
perceived as equally serious in both their American and European samples. 
however, their finding that climate change was perceived as somewhat more 
serious than global warming among Republicans, but vice versa for Democrats, 
hints that the effects of these terms may vary across political partisans in the 
united States where climate issues have become highly politicized (e.g., 
bernauer 2013; Dunlap and McCright 2008). In this vein, a survey experiment 
by Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) asked a sample of 2,267 u.S. adults to 
report their personal existence belief on an item adapted from a previous 
national poll (AbC News, Stanford university, and TIME 2006) that was worded 
in terms of “global warming” or “climate change,” depending on condition (for-
matting original):
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You may have heard about the idea that the world’s temperature may have been going 
up [changing] over the past 100 years, a phenomenon sometimes called “global warm-
ing” [“climate change”]. what is your personal opinion regarding whether or not this has 
been happening? {Definitely has not been happening; Probably has not been hap-
pening; unsure, but leaning toward it has not been happening; Not sure either way; 
unsure, but leaning toward it has been happening; Probably has been happening; 
Definitely has been happening}.
Overall, results revealed less belief in “global warming” than “climate change”: 
whereas 74.0 percent of respondents reported a high level of belief (5 or above) 
when the questionnaire was worded in terms of climate change, this figure 
dropped to 67.7 percent on the global warming version. what is notable is that 
this effect varied significantly across political groups, such that a majority of 
Republicans reported high belief in “climate change” (60.2 percent), while only 
a minority reported high belief in “global warming” (44.0 percent). In marked 
contrast, most Democrats reported high belief regardless of question wording 
(86.9 percent vs. 86.4 percent, respectively). Stated another way, the apparent 
partisan divide on personal existence belief fell from 42.9 points under global 
warming wording to just 26.2 points under climate change wording—a reduction 
of nearly 40 percent. Practically, these results suggest that the public perception 
of a large partisan divide may be partly attributable to the fact that many climate 
surveys ask about “global warming” rather than “climate change” (see Nisbet and 
Myers [2007] for a review).
thus, we would suggest that the findings from Villar and Krosnick (2011) and 
Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) are more compatible than they may at first 
appear. both studies cast doubt on Luntz’s strategic advice that conservatives 
should emphasize “climate change” to promote the political Right’s pursuit of the 
status quo in climate policy: in cases where the terms are perceived differently, 
the data appear to suggest that Republicans are more likely to believe that “cli-
mate change” (as opposed to “global warming”) exists and to rate it as slightly 
more serious. we see these patterns as complementary given that, theoretically, 
judgments about the seriousness of this issue should rest on the belief that it 
really exists (Krosnick et al. 2006).
In addition to “global warming” and “climate change,” Jaskulsky and besel 
(2013) examined responses to two additional terms: “climate disruption” and 
“climate crisis.” they randomly assigned 225 undergraduates in the western 
united States to read a climate change news article that was framed in one of 
these four ways before soliciting agreement with statements related to the issue’s 
severity (e.g., “Rising temperatures pose a serious threat to my way of life”). 
Results showed that wording influenced a number of beliefs, with “climate dis-
ruption” promoting the highest levels of concern and “climate crisis” promoting 
the lowest (“global warming” and “climate change” typically fell in between). 
Interestingly, the results revealed little variation across terms on the endorse-
ment of statements related to the scientific consensus (e.g., “Experts are agreed 
that there is a problem with rising temperatures”). however, the researchers note 
that their small, nonrepresentative sample may limit the generalizability of their 
findings to the broader American public.
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Relating Climate beliefs to Policy Preferences
As is evident in this review, research into the effects of question wording in cli-
mate surveys has explored a number of outcome variables; in each case, there are 
theoretical and practical reasons for doing so. For instance, models of climate 
engagement posit that the belief that the problem exists is fundamental to higher-
order judgments of problem seriousness, which in turn contribute to the public’s 
willingness to support legislative action to mitigate climate change (e.g., manda-
tory cuts to greenhouse gas emissions) (Krosnick et al. 2006). In addition, under-
standing the extent to which public opinion is swayed by different terminology 
carries practical implications for the design and interpretation of climate polls.
Researchers have recently begun to explore the role that respondents’ percep-
tions of the beliefs held by climate scientists—so-called meta-beliefs—play in the 
willingness to support broad-scale societal action to mitigate climate change. 
Analyzing u.S. nationally representative survey data from 2010, Ding et  al. 
(2011) found that respondents who perceived that a majority of scientists agree 
that global warming is real expressed greater certainty that it is really happening 
along with more support for climate mitigation policies. In related work, 
McCright, Dunlap, and Xiao (2013) reported on representative data from 2012 
that further demonstrated the relationship between perceiving scientific consen-
sus and support for mitigation policy, a pattern that held for conservatives and 
liberals alike. In addition to the climate domain, Lewandowsky, gignac, and 
Vaughan (2013) found that perceiving scientific consensus on a number of issues 
(e.g., that smoking causes cancer, that hIV causes AIDS) predicted the accept-
ance of related scientific propositions and, moreover, that making the scientific 
consensus salient through a situational manipulation bolstered this tendency.
while these studies compellingly suggest that meta-beliefs about the scientific 
consensus have important downstream consequences, they simultaneously raise 
additional questions. First, the questionnaires fielded by both Ding et al. (2011) 
and McCright, Dunlap, and Xiao (2013) were worded in terms of “global warm-
ing,” leaving it unclear whether a different pattern would emerge had respond-
ents instead been asked about the consensus on “climate change.” Second, given 
that both personal existence beliefs and perceptions of the scientific consensus 
have been theorized to mediate support for climate policy, it is possible that the 
order in which these questions are posed may influence the answers obtained, as 
suggested by a body of research demonstrating that information rendered cogni-
tively accessible by preceding survey questions can influence subsequent 
responses (for reviews, see bless and Schwarz 2010; Schuman and Presser 1981; 
tourangeau and Rasinski 1988).
the Study
the study presented here builds on the literature discussed above in a number 
of ways. First, we tested whether the previously reported effect of “global 
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warming” versus “climate change” wording on personal existence beliefs 
(Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz 2011) would replicate among a sample of u.S. 
political partisans surveyed more than three years after the original survey exper-
iment was conducted. beyond the general value of replication for testing the 
reliability of the effects, the time period bracketed by the original study and the 
replication (i.e., 2009 to 2012) was notable because it witnessed fluctuations in 
public opinion about climate change (e.g., Newport 2010). we also examined 
whether the “global warming”/“climate change” wording effect would extend 
beyond personal existence beliefs to influence two additional opinions that are 
commonly solicited in climate change surveys, namely, perceptions about the 
scientific consensus and support for legislation to limit greenhouse gas emissions. 
More formally, we hypothesized:
hypothesis 1a: wording survey questions in terms of “global warming” as 
opposed to “climate change” will shift apparent public opinion, such that 
beliefs that are more consistent with a skeptical position on climate issues 
will be observed in response to “global warming” wording.
hypothesis 1b: the expected effect will be more pronounced among groups 
that typically report greater climate skepticism, namely, Republicans.
In addition, we explored the role of question order and its possible interaction 
with question wording on climate beliefs in the national survey context. 
Numerous studies at the intersection of cognitive psychology and survey meth-
odology demonstrate that preceding questions can sway responses to subsequent 
questions by affecting the type of information that is brought to mind (e.g., 
McFarland 1981; for reviews, see Schwarz 1999; Sudman, bradburn, and 
Schwarz 1996). In this vein, we explored whether support for curbing green-
house gas emissions—a policy preference that is frequently polled in climate 
surveys (e.g., Washington Post and AbC News 2010)—might vary depending on 
whether the preceding question elicited thoughts about one’s personal existence 
beliefs as opposed to those of climate scientists, given that these questions are 
likely to bring to mind different considerations that impinge upon support for 
climate mitigation policy (e.g., Republican doubts about the existence of “global 
warming” in the former case). More formally, we asked:
Research Question 1: Does apparent support for limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions to reduce “global warming” or “climate change” shift depending 
on the order in which survey questions are asked?
Method
Participants
Data were collected between August 25 and September 5, 2012, by gfK 
Knowledge Networks (gfK). Respondents were invited to participate from 
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KnowledgePanel®, gfK’s web-based panel made up of individuals recruited 
through random-digit dialing and address-based sampling procedures who 
agree to complete a demographic questionnaire and respond periodically to 
surveys in exchange for incentive points that are redeemable for cash. 
households without Internet access instead receive monthly Internet service 
and equipment (formerly webtV, now a laptop) for completing surveys, 
affording a panel that is representative of the u.S. population.3 because our 
hypotheses and research question focused on political partisans, only panelists 
who had been previously self-identified as Republican (n = 1,067) or Democrat 
(n = 974) were invited to participate (see table 1 for sample demographics).4 
A random sample of 3,070 was invited and 2,401 completed the survey, result-
ing in a response rate of 78.2 percent (95 percent sampling margin of error = 
±2.0 percent).
tAbLE 1
Demographics of Survey Respondents (Unweighted Analytic Sample) (n = 2,041)
Political party identification  
 Democrats 47.7 (974)
 Republicans 52.3 (1,067)
Political ideology (M [SD]) 4.24 (1.52)
Age (M [SD]) 50.6 (16.6)
gender
 Females 51.0 (1,040)
 Males 49.0 (1,001)
highest level of education attained
 Less than high school 7.8 (159)
 high school diploma or equivalent 29.3 (599)
 Some college 28.3 (577)
 bachelor’s degree or higher 34.6 (706)
Race/ethnicity
 white, non-hispanic 75.6 (1,544)
 black, non-hispanic 8.5 (173)
 Other, non-hispanic 4.5 (92)
 hispanic 9.2 (187)
 2+ races, non-hispanic 2.2 (45)
Region of residence
 Northeast 18.9 (385)
 Midwest 23.3 (476)
 South 35.7 (729)
 west 22.1 (451)
NOtE: Data are displayed as percentages (ns) except political ideology and age. Political ide-
ology scaled from 1 = extremely liberal to 7 = extremely conservative.
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Procedures
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four survey versions using a 2 
(question wording: “global warming” vs. “climate change”) × 2 (question order: 
personal existence belief, support for climate mitigation policy, perceived scien-
tific consensus vs. personal existence belief, perceived scientific consensus, sup-
port for climate mitigation policy) design.5 the first between-subjects factor 
examined the effect of question wording on each of the three main outcome 
variables, whereas the counterbalanced second factor tested whether support for 
climate mitigation policy varied by question order (i.e., whether this item was 
asked second and immediately after personal existence belief vs. third and imme-
diately after perceived scientific consensus).
Measures
Personal existence belief. Respondents first indicated their personal existence 
belief on the item employed by Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) (see 
above).
Perceived scientific consensus. we solicited perceptions of the scientific con-
sensus with a question adapted from previous national surveys (Newport 2010) 
and used in recent research highlighting the importance of this meta-belief (Ding 
et al. 2011; McCright, Dunlap, and Xiao 2013) (alternative wording in brackets; 
formatting original):
Just your impression, which one of the following statements do you think is most accu-
rate – most scientists believe that global warming [climate change] is occurring, most 
scientists believe that global warming [climate change] is NOt occurring, or most sci-
entists are unsure about whether global warming [climate change] is occurring or not?
Support for climate mitigation policy. Participants rated their support for 
federal legislative action to curb greenhouse gas emissions on the following item 
adapted from the Washington Post and AbC News Poll (2010). Specifically, par-
ticipants were asked (formatting original):
Do you think the federal government should or should not regulate the release of green-
house gases from sources like power plants, cars and factories in an effort to reduce 
global warming [climate change]?6
Political party identification. gfK’s panel measure of political party identifica-
tion was used to categorize Democrats and Republicans in our sample.7
Control variables. Finally, we incorporated a number of demographic varia-
bles provided by gfK that have been shown to predict climate beliefs and party 
identification in previous work, namely, gender, age, educational attainment, 
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ethnicity, and regional location (Northwest, Midwest, South, and west) (e.g., 
hamilton 2010; Krosnick et al. 2006; McCright 2010).
Analytic strategy
For each of the three main outcome variables, we ran a series of regression 
models to test for independent effects of question wording (“global warming” vs. 
“climate change”), political identification (Republican vs. Democrat), and their 
interactive effects. An additional series of models assessed the independent 
effects of question order and all possible interactive effects in our analysis of sup-
port for climate mitigation policy. while gfK uses the aforementioned control 
variables plus metropolitan area and Internet access to compute statistical 
weights that adjust for known deviations from u.S. Census data, we analyze the 
unweighted data given our primary interest in experimental effects among our 
partisan-restricted sample.
Results
Effect of question wording on personal existence beliefs
to test whether question wording elicited differential levels of personal exist-
ence beliefs among this sample of u.S. political partisans, we ran an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model regressing this variable (1 to 7 scale, where 7 = defi-
nitely has been happening) onto question wording condition (0 = “climate 
change,” 1 = “global warming”), controlling for the aforementioned covariates. 
we then ran a second model testing the overall effect of partisanship (0 = 
Democrats, 1 = Republicans) on personal existence beliefs regardless of question 
wording, again controlling for covariates. Finally, we added the question wording 
by political identification interaction term to the previous model to test whether 
partisanship moderated the wording effect on personal existence beliefs as 
expected.
Results from the first model revealed an overall effect of question wording. 
Compared to the “climate change” questionnaire, the “global warming” version 
elicited significantly lower personal existence beliefs, b = −.31, t (2,021) = –4.03, 
p < .001 (Mgw = 4.92 vs. MCC = 5.23). whereas 62.0 percent of respondents 
endorsed a high level of belief (i.e., 5 or above) in “global warming” (i.e., 634 out 
of 1,023), 69.9 percent endorsed a high level of belief in “climate change” (i.e., 
702 out of 1,005). thus, hypothesis 1a is supported by the data. the second 
model revealed that Republicans reported significantly lower personal existence 
beliefs than did Democrats, b = −1.24, t (2,021) = –16.18, p < .001 (MRepublicans = 
4.48 vs. MDemocrats = 5.72)—a finding that is consistent with prior work on the 
partisan nature of climate beliefs.8 Moreover, the third model revealed a signifi-
cant interaction between question wording and political identification, b = −.36, 
t (2,019) = –2.48, p = .01.9
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to probe this interaction, we conducted a priori defined planned contrast 
analyses by using the linear combination of the coefficient (“lincom”) command 
in Stata to compare mean-level existence beliefs in “global warming” versus “cli-
mate change” separately for Republicans and Democrats. Results revealed that 
Republicans expressed significantly lower personal existence beliefs in global 
warming as compared to climate change (Mgw = 4.25, MCC = 4.72), b = −.47, 95 
percent confidence interval (CI): –.66 to –.27, t = −4.61, p < .001. In contrast, 
this wording effect was not observed among Democrats, who showed similarly 
high mean-level existence beliefs across conditions (Mgw = 5.67, MCC = 5.77), 
b = −.10, 95 percent CI: –.31 to .11, t = −0.97, p = .33. Expressed in percentage 
terms, whereas a minority of Republicans endorsed high belief in “global warm-
ing” (46.2 percent), a majority endorsed high belief in “climate change” (59.1 
percent)—an effect that was much smaller and nonsignificant among Democrats 
(79.9 percent vs. 81.6 percent, respectively) (Figure 1). thus, hypothesis 1b is 
also supported by the data. this interaction pattern replicates our previous word-
ing results (Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz 2011) on an independent sample of 
u.S. partisans collected more than three years later.
Effect of question wording on perceived scientific consensus
Next, to test whether question wording elicited different perceptions of the 
scientific consensus (three-categorical nominal scale: scientists believe global 
warming/climate change is occurring, is NOT occurring, or are unsure), we ran a 
series of multinomial logistic regression models to estimate the relative likelihood 
(using relative risk ratio, RRR) that respondents would endorse a given nominal 
response category over another. Results from the first model again revealed an 
overall effect of question wording such that compared to the “climate change” 
FIguRE 1
Effect of Question Wording (“Global Warming” vs. “Climate Change”) on Personal 
Existence Beliefs, by Political Identification
NOtE: Error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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questionnaire, the “global warming” version elicited a more skeptical response 
pattern—thus providing further support for hypothesis 1a. Specifically, the rela-
tive likelihood of respondents endorsing the “is NOT occurring” option over the 
“is occurring” option was greater in the “global warming” condition (11.5 percent 
and 65.1 percent, respectively) than in the “climate change” condition (8.1 per-
cent and 73.2 percent, respectively) (RRR = 1.57, p < .01) (Figure 2). Moreover, 
the relative likelihood of respondents endorsing the “unsure” option over the “is 
occurring” option was greater in the “global warming” condition (23.3 percent and 
65.1 percent, respectively) than in the “climate change “ condition (18.7 percent 
vs. 73.2 percent, respectively) (RRR = 1.40, p < .01).10 Again consistent with prior 
work, Republicans were less likely than Democrats to endorse that most scientists 
believe the phenomenon is real. Specifically, Republicans were relatively more 
likely to endorse the “is NOT occurring” option over the “is occurring” option 
(15.2 percent vs. 57.4 percent, respectively) than were Democrats (3.9 percent vs. 
82.6 percent, respectively) (RRR = 5.61, p < .001). Moreover, Republicans were 
relatively more likely to endorse the “unsure” option over the “is occurring” 
option (27.4 percent vs. 57.4 percent, respectively) than were Democrats (13.5 
percent vs. 82.6 percent, respectively) (RRR = 2.92, p < .001).
Recall that we expected that this wording effect on perceived scientific con-
sensus would be larger among Republicans than among Democrats. Contrary to 
hypothesis 1b and in contrast to the pattern observed for personal existence 
beliefs reported above, the wording effect reported here was not moderated by 
political identification (|z|s < .65).
Effect of question wording and order on climate mitigation support
Our final analysis took the form of multiple logistic regression models in which 
support for limiting greenhouse gas emissions (two-category nominal scale: 
FIguRE 2
Effect of Question Wording (“Global Warming” vs. “Climate Change”) on Perceived 
Scientific Consensus, by Political Identification
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should vs. should not regulate) was regressed separately onto question wording 
condition, question order condition (policy support first vs. scientific consensus 
first; dummy-coded with policy support first as the referent), and political iden-
tification to test for their overall independent effects. given the exploratory 
nature of our question order analysis (see Research Question 1), we ran an addi-
tional series of logistic regression models to explore the independent effect of 
each possible interaction term (i.e., all two-way interactions: wording × order, 
wording × politics, order × politics; and the three-way interaction: wording × 
order × politics).
Of our three independent variables of interest (question wording, question 
order, and political identification), only political identification emerged as a sig-
nificant predictor of support for climate mitigation policy in its logistic regression 
model. Consistent with the partisan differences noted above, Republicans were 
less likely to endorse limiting greenhouse gas emissions than were Democrats 
(OR = 0.20, z = −13.84, p < .001), with 55.4 percent of Republicans but 86.4 
percent of Democrats selecting the “should regulate” response. Neither question 
wording nor question order emerged as a significant predictor of policy support 
overall. Specifically, 69.1 percent of respondents in the “global warming” condi-
tion versus 71.9 percent in the “climate change” condition endorsed the “should 
regulate” response (OR = 0.88, z = −1.34, p = .18). turning to question order, 
70.4 percent of respondents endorsed the “should regulate” response when the 
scientific consensus question came first compared to 70.6 percent when the 
policy support question came first (OR = 0.99, z = −0.09, p = .93). Moreover, 
none of the two-way interactions emerged as significant (ORs < 1.31, zs < 1.40, 
ps > .16). thus, hypotheses 1a and 1b were not supported.
however, the three-way interaction between question wording, question 
order, and political identification was significant (OR = 2.41, z = 1.96, p = .05), 
and we again probed this interaction using the “lincom” command in Stata. 
Results revealed that when the policy support question came first (i.e., immedi-
ately after personal existence belief and before perceived scientific consensus), 
Republicans were significantly less likely to support reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions to reduce “global warming” as compared to “climate change” (Mgw = 
50.8 percent, MCC = 60.6 percent), 95 percent CI: –.18 to –.02, z = −2.31, p < 
.05. In contrast, this pattern did not emerge among Democrats, who were equally 
likely to support this policy regardless of question wording (Mgw = 85.4 percent, 
MCC = 86.5 percent), 95 percent CI: –.07 to .10, z = 1.28, p = .20. by comparison, 
when the scientific consensus question came first, no differences were observed 
across the question wording conditions, either among Republicans (Mgw = 58.9 
percent, MCC = 54.2 percent) or Democrats (Mgw = 83.5 percent, MCC = 87.3 
percent) (|z|s < 1.29, ps > .05).11
Discussion
It is widely acknowledged that addressing the threats posed by climate change 
will require a deeper understanding of human psychological processes (e.g., 
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Reser and Swim 2011; Stern 1992). National-level surveys are an important tool 
for illuminating these processes, and past surveys have unveiled numerous fac-
tors that predict self-reported climate beliefs, including gender; educational 
attainment; and, notably, political orientation, which frequently emerges as a 
robust moderator of climate beliefs and concerns (McCright and Dunlap 2011). 
Although it is well-established that survey data are prone to shift with question-
naire design variables—including question wording, question order, and response 
option format—only a handful of published studies speaks directly to these 
effects in the context of climate change surveys. In addition to reviewing existing 
studies, our goal here was to describe results from a survey of u.S. political par-
tisans who were randomly assigned to different question wording and order treat-
ments to examine the effect of these questionnaire design variables on routinely 
polled opinions and beliefs about climate issues (see Druckman and Lupia [2012] 
for a discussion of survey experiments).
beyond replicating the familiar partisan pattern wherein climate change exist-
ence beliefs and support for policies that address it are more common among 
Democrats than Republicans, our results reveal that survey responses also 
depend on whether the questionnaire is worded in terms of “global warming” or 
“climate change.” Specifically, whereas approximately 70 percent of our respond-
ents reported a high level of personal existence belief when asked about “climate 
change,” this figure fell to 62 percent for “global warming.” Importantly, an 
analysis of political identification revealed that Republicans, in particular, were 
significantly more likely to report higher personal existence beliefs under “cli-
mate change” as compared to “global warming” wording (approximately 59 per-
cent vs. 46 percent, respectively). the personal existence beliefs of Democrats, 
by comparison, were unaffected by this wording treatment (82 percent vs. 
80  percent, respectively). these results replicate previously published data 
(Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz 2011) and suggest that the size of the often-
discussed political divide on climate issues may be partly due to the way the issue 
is worded. we see this as an important observation given the lack of a “gold 
standard” for question wording in climate surveys (greenhill et al. 2013) and the 
tendency for some surveys that purport to measure climate change opinions to 
field questions that are worded in terms of global warming.
Our results also suggest that the global warming/climate change framing effect 
extends beyond personal existence beliefs to color perceptions of the scientific 
consensus. Despite the overwhelming agreement among climate scientists that 
the climate issue presents a real and formidable challenge to human and natural 
systems worldwide, substantial portions of the public incorrectly believe that the 
“jury is still out”—a misperception fueled by interest groups that lobby heavily 
against environmental regulations and by the disproportionate share of media 
attention allocated to the (minority) opinions of climate deniers (boykoff and 
boykoff 2004; Feldman et al. 2011; Oreskes and Conway 2010; Schlichting 2013). 
At the same time, recent survey research suggests that these meta-beliefs play an 
important role in the public’s support for climate mitigation policies (Ding et al. 
2011; McCright, Dunlap, and Xiao 2013). As our experimental results indicate, 
these meta-beliefs themselves appear to shift with question wording, such that 
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survey respondents are more likely to perceive scientific agreement when the 
issue is referred to as “climate change” rather than “global warming.”
Although we observed no overall effect of question wording on support for 
limiting greenhouse gases, question order moderated the effect of question 
wording across political partisans. Namely, when support for climate mitigation 
policy was asked directly after personal existence beliefs, Republicans were less 
likely to support limiting greenhouse gas emissions to reduce “global warming” 
as compared to “climate change.” In contrast, when the scientific consensus 
question intervened, this effect was not observed. Although a more definitive 
explanation awaits, this observation may rest on the ability of preceding questions 
to activate stored knowledge structures that respondents are consequently more 
likely to use in forming related judgments. Numerous models of human judg-
ment posit that people rely on heuristics to conserve cognitive effort (e.g., the 
“cognitive miser” perspective; Fiske and taylor 1991). In the survey context, an 
efficient way to conserve cognitive effort is to draw on information rendered 
accessible in working memory by a preceding question (Strack 1992). thus, 
Republicans’ greater doubts about the existence of “global warming” (vs. “climate 
change”) may encourage them to report less support for a climate mitigation 
policy when the questions are asked back-to-back but not when a question about 
the scientific consensus comes in between. Although it is unclear whether the 
effect’s elimination was caused by the specific nature of the scientific consensus 
question as opposed to the simple presence of any intervening question, prior 
research suggests that the public’s adherence to the opinions of scientists on 
politically controversial issues varies across groups (e.g., brossard and Nisbet 
2007) and that perceiving a scientific consensus predicts support for climate 
mitigation even among those traditionally more skeptical of climate science, such 
as Republicans (Rolfe-Redding et al. 2011).
we note some limitations of this work. First, we expect the pattern of results 
reported here, as well as those reported in previous research reviewed above, to 
be highly context-sensitive and dependent on other seemingly relevant informa-
tion that comes to mind when respondents are answering survey questions. As 
with other cognitive frames that guide mental construal, “global warming” and 
“climate change” likely render different knowledge accessible, which may in turn 
constrain the extent to which other activated information influences judgments 
and decision-making (e.g., as when reminders about unseasonable temperatures 
influence beliefs about “global warming” but not “climate change”; Schuldt and 
Roh 2014). therefore, presenting respondents with both frames in close succes-
sion (as in within-subjects designs) or asking numerous questions related to cli-
mate and environmental issues may produce a different pattern of results than 
was observed here. Second, our exploratory analysis of the role of question order 
in support for climate mitigation policy involved multiple statistical tests, and 
because of the accompanying risk of false positives, we interpret this finding cau-
tiously until it is replicated with independent data. third, we reiterate that the 
wording variants examined here—global warming and climate change—are not 
synonymous but, rather, appear to be used interchangeably in political discourse 
and survey research despite (or perhaps because of) this fact. Indeed, research 
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reviewed and presented here suggests that some respondents respond quite dif-
ferently to these terms, suggesting that survey researchers and those who inter-
pret survey data are wise to bear in mind that this wording matters.
Overall, this work underscores the influence of seemingly mundane question-
naire design considerations in shaping apparent American public opinion on cli-
mate change. we end by noting practical implications for those drawing 
inferences from climate survey data. Many national surveys purporting to meas-
ure partisans’ beliefs about climate change employ questions that are worded in 
terms of global warming—a less trivial detail than it may at first appear. Similarly, 
our results suggest that the well-known political divide that those surveys dem-
onstrate may partly derive from question wording, given our finding that the 
pronounced partisan gap on “global warming” gives way to a broader consensus 
when the questionnaire instead asks about “climate change.”
Notes
1. “global warming” and “climate change” refer to technically different but related phenomena, with 
the former referring to increases in average global surface temperatures and the latter encompassing a host 
of climate-related changes to ecosystems worldwide (see Environmental Protection Agency 2014). Much 
of the work reviewed here examines possible wording effects not from the standpoint of equivalent mean-
ing but rather equivalent usage.
2. For nonexperimental data revealing a similar pattern, see an earlier study comparing “global warm-
ing” image associations in the u.S. to “climate change” image associations in the uK (Lorenzoni et  al. 
2006).
3. See http://www.knowledgenetworks.com for more information.
4.  gfK’s standard measure of political party identification (“XPARtY7”) was used for identifying 
Republicans and Democrats, where 1 = Strong Republican, 2 = Not Strong Republican, 3 = Leans 
Republican, 4 = Undecided/Independent/Other, 5 = Leans Democrat, 6 = Not Strong Democrat, and 7 = 
Strong Democrat. Panelists choosing option 4 were not invited to participate to maximize the number of 
political partisans in the sample. Our analysis collapses across categories 1–3 (“Republicans”) and 5–7 
(“Democrats”).
5. Personal existence belief was always asked first to provide maximum statistical power for the replica-
tion test of the Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) findings. we also explored the possible role of self-
affirmation in self-reported climate beliefs by having participants first rank-order a list of values by their 
importance to the self (affirmation treatment) or someone else (control) (Sherman, Nelson, and Steele 
2000). No effect emerged, and we collapse this variable in our analysis.
6. A follow-up question assessed attitude strength for this item (“Do you think that way very strongly 
or somewhat strongly?”). we analyze only the should/should not response as a binary measure of policy 
support.
7. See note 2.
8. Political ideology (1 = extremely liberal to 7 = extremely conservative, analyzed as a three-category 
nominal variable: liberal, moderate, conservative) generally revealed a similar effect pattern as party iden-
tification. Compared to liberals, conservatives reported lower personal existence beliefs, were less likely to 
perceive that scientists agree the phenomenon is occurring, and were less likely to support limiting green-
house gas emissions (ps < .001). the interaction between question wording and political ideology was also 
significant, with conservatives, in particular, reporting less belief in “global warming” as compared to 
“climate change” (b = −.48, t = −2.64, p < .01).
9. Educational attainment and race also emerged as significant predictors of personal existence beliefs, 
with greater belief among those with at least some college education (combined referent group: less than 
high school or completed high school) and white respondents (combined referent group: nonwhites) (ts > 
3.00, ps < .01).
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10. Some covariates also emerged as significant predictors in these models. Respondents with at least 
some college education were relatively less likely to endorse the “is NOT occurring” or “unsure” option 
over the “is occurring” response; the same pattern was observed for white (as compared to nonwhite) 
respondents. Age was also significant, such that younger respondents were relatively less likely to endorse 
the “unsure” option over either of the other options (RRRs ≥ 0.52, |z|s ≥ 2.10, ps < .05).
11. Race/ethnicity also emerged as a significant predictor of support for regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions in the full model, with greater support among white as compared to nonwhite respondents (OR 
= 1.34, z = 2.17, p < .05).
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